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Military Law: Should Military Personnel Be
Court-Martialed for Offenses That Are Not
Service-Connected?
Someone in the military shoplifts a cassette tape from a local off-base store.
Is this crime service-connected? Should it matter if the military member was
in uniform? Should it matter if this same event occurred in a foreign country?
In O'Callahanv. Parker,' the United States Supreme Court held that any
court-martial lacks jurisdiction to try a military member accused of a crime
that is not service-connected. In June 1987 the Court overruled O'Callahan
in Solorio v. United States.' It held that the subject matter jurisdiction of
a court-martial depends solely on the accused's military status and not on
the service connection of the offense charged.
This note will begin with a brief overview of military law. An overview
is important because the rationale of O'Callahanis dependent upon the inaccurate belief that military courts do not adequately protect a defendant's rights,
and therefore their jurisdiction should be limited. Next it will analyze and
assess the impact of O'Callahan, including its various interpretations, on
military law. This historical analysis is necessary because even though
O'Callahanwas overruled; there is a current movement in Congress to return
to pre-Solorio law. Finally, this note will examine Solorio, its meaning as
new law and the changes it will bring.
Military Law
The purpose of military law is twofold. The first purpose is to preserve
order and discipline.' Military discipline has been defined as "that standard
of personal deportment, work requirement, courtesy, appearance, and ethical
conduct which, inculcated in men and women, will enable them singly or collectively to perform their mission with an optimum efficiency.", In combat,
a unit's discipline level may determine whether its members live or die.'
The second purpose concerns the equitable administration of justice.6 In
reality, defendants in military courts possess rights at least equal to if not
greater than their civilian counterparts. Military law has not been based solely
on a commander's will for quite some time.
American military law has been traced back to the Code of Gustavus
Adolphus in 1621 and to the British Articles of War of 1774.1 In 1775 the
1.
2.
3.
4.

395 U.S. 258 (1969).
107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987), reh'g denied 108 S. Ct. 30 (1988).
H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND TE MIITARY, 12 (1972).
ARMED FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE, TEE ARMED FORCES OFFICER 122 (1975). See also

United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2069 (1987) ("military discipline involves not only
obedience to orders, but more generally duty and loyalty to one's service and to one's country").
5. Imwinkelried & Gilligan, The UnconstitutionalBurden of Article 15: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE
L.J. 534, 548 (1974).
6. H. MOYER, supra note 3, at 12.
7. W. AYCOCIC & S. WuRFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER TiE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSnCE

9 (1955).
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Continental Congress adopted the American Articles of War and the Rules
for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies.8 American military
law was unified when the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) became
effective on May 31, 1951. 9

Courts-martial are assembled by the proper convening authority"° and are
temporary criminal courts that exist under the executive branch, rather than

as Article III courts under the judicial branch.I Even so, courts-martial decisions may ultimately be appealed to the United States Supreme Court.' 2 Two
chief differences distinguish a trial by court-martial from a trial before a federal
district court. First, the court-martial is bifurcated, with presentation of
material concerning sentencing occurring only after the defendant has been
found guilty. 3 During sentencing, the defense has substantial latitude to offer evidence of mitigating factors.' Second, the court members or "jurors"
have the power to question witnesses, request evidence, and sentence those
convicted. '
Under military law, courts-martial are differentiated according to the range
of punishments they may impose. In addition, commanders are given the option to impose punishment that is usually less severe than sanctions handed
down by a court-martial. This lesser degree of sanction is referred to as nonjudicial punishment.
Nonjudicial Punishment: Article 15
Nonjudicial punishment is available under article 15 of the U.C.M.J.' 6
Punishments under article 15 include levels of disciplinary action that are within
the discretion of a commanding officer to impose for minor offenses.'" They

8. H. MOYER, supra note 3, at 10.
9. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982). See generallyMorgan, The Background of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 6 V~AD. L. Rav. 169 (1953).
10. Lawful convening authorities are designated by the Secretary of Defense and are usually
general officers for general courts-martial and base commanders for special courts-martial. In
a general court-martial, the convening authority may not refer a case to trial unless the Staff
Judge Advocate determines that the specifications alleged offenses that are warranted by the
evidence and are subject to military jurisdiction. U.C.M.J. art. 34, 10 U.S.C. § 834 (Supp. IV
1986). See generally Garner, Structural Changes in Military CriminalPracticeat the Trial and
Appellate Level as a Result of the Military Justice Act of 1983, 33 FED. B. NEws & J. 116,
117 (1986).
11. The primary constitutional bases of military law are found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, and U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Cox, The Army, The Courts,
and The Constitution:The Evolution Of MilitaryJustice, 118 Mm.. L. REv. 1 (1987); Henderson,
Courts-Martialand the Constitution:The OriginalUnderstanding,71 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1957).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (1983). Free military counsel is supplied to the accused at all appellate
levels or the accused may retain civilian counsel at his own expense. F. LEDERER, TIM ROAD
TO THE MILITARY COURTHOUsE 14 (1976).
13. F. Lederer, supra note 12, at 14.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1982).
17. Whether an offense is minor depends on several factors: the nature of the offense
and the circumstances surrounding its commission; the offender's age, rank, duty
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are more serious than an administrative corrective measure," but avoid the

stigma of a court-martial conviction. 9 A commander's authority to impose
punishment under article 15 is qualified because any military member has the
right to demand trial by court-martial rather than accept an article 15 punishpunishment depends on the
ment. 20 Furthermore, the severity of nonjudicial
2'
it.
imposing
commander
the
of
rank
Article 32 PretrialInvestigation
U.C.M.J. article 3222 requires a pretrial investigation before a charge may

be referred to a general court-martial.23 An article 32 investigation basically

serves the same purpose as a civilian grand jury. Both determine whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant future prosecution against an accused. The
major differences between the two are that during an article 32 investigation,
the accused is entitled to be present, to be informed of his or her rights, and

to be represented by counsel.

4

assignment, record, and experience; and the maximum sentence possible for the
offense if tried by general court-martial .... The decision whether an offense is
"minor" is a matter of discretion for the commander imposing nonjudicial
punishment.
MAuaAL FOR Couris-MART= (1984), pt. V, NonjudicialPunishmentProcedure, I1le [hereinafter
M.C.M.].
18. Administrative corrective measures include letters of reprimand, counseling sessions and
Ig (1984).
administrative withholding of privileges. M.C.M., supra note 17,
19. Id., lb and c. (1984). See generally Imwinkelried & Gilligan, supra note 5.
20. J. HAwKINs, THE Am

FORCE

OMfiCER'S GUIDE 174 (27th ed. 1986).

21. A commander in the grade of major or above may adjudge punishment to an airman
of his command as follows: not more than 30 days correctional custody, forfeiture
of half of his pay for two months, extra duty of 45 days, restriction for two months,
detention of half his pay for three months, or reduction in grade (an E-4 or higher
may not be reduced more than two grades). A commander below the grade of
major may under Article 15 punish an airman of his command by imposing not
more than: one week of correctional custody, forfeiture of one week's pay, extra
duty for two weeks, restriction to limits for two weeks, detention of two weeks
pay, or reduction of one grade (provided the commander has the authority to promote to the grade from which the airman is to be demoted) .... A commander
in general officer grade may under Article 15 punish an officer under his command
by imposing not more than: suspension from duty for two months, arrest in quarters
for one month, forfeiture of half his pay for two months, or detention of half
his pay for three months.
Id.
22. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1982).
OF CouRTs-MARTIAL 405(a) (1984) [hereinafter R.C.M.].
24. (0 Rights of the accused. At any pre-trial investigation under this rule the accused
shall have the right to:
(1) Be informed of the charges under investigation;
(2) Be informed of the identity of the accuser;
(3) Except in circumstances described in R.C.M. 804(b)(2), be present throughout the taking of evidence;
(4) Be represented by counsel;
(5) Be informed of the witnesses and other evidence then known
to the investigating officer;

23. RuLEs
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An article 32 investigation begins when a court-martial convening authority appoints an investigating officer. This officer must be at least a major
or a lieutenant commander, or a military member who has had legal training.25 At the conclusion of an article 32 investigation, the investigating officer compiles a report that recommends what action, if any, should be taken.
Summary Courts-Martial
The summary court-martial is the most restricted of all courts-martial in
the maximum penalties it may impose. Its jurisdiction is limited to the trial
of enlisted personnel for noncapital offenses. A summary court-martial is
6
presided over by a single commissioned officer who need not be an attorney.1
Although no counsel is provided to the prosecution or defense, the appearance
of counsel on behalf of the accused is not prohibited. After receiving timely
notice of the charges and the name of his accuser, the accused has the option
to refuse trial by summary court-martial. However, this refusal could result
in the referral of charges to a special or general court-martial.
Special Courts-Martial
The special court-martial is the intermediate type of court-martial. Its
makeup is flexible; it can consist of a military judge and a panel of three
or more members, or the judge or the panel alone. 8 The accused may request
trial by a military judge alone and may request free military counsel. If
members are present and the accused is an enlisted person, he may demand
that at least one-third of the members actually sitting be enlisted personnel.2 9
(6) Be informed of the purpose of the investigation;
(7) Be informed of the right against self-incrimination under Article
31;
(8) Cross-examine witnesses who are produced under subsection (g)
of this rule;
(9) Have witnesses produced as provided for in subsection (g) of
this rule;
(10) Have evidence, including documents or physical evidence, within
the control of military authorities produced as provided under subsection (g) of this rule;
(11) Present anything in defense, extenuation, or mitigation for consideration by the investigating officer; and
(12) Make a statement in any form.
R.C.M., supra note 23, at 405(f).
25. Id.at 405(d)(1).
26. This officer should be at least a lieutenant in the Navy or Coast Guard or a captain
in the Army, Air Force or Marine Corps. Id., 1301(a).
27. The "presiding officer acts as judge, fact finder, prosecutor, and defense counsel."
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 32 (1976). At least one commentator feels that summary
courts-martial violate due process of law. Note, The Summary Court-Martialin Constitutional
Perspective, 14 Hous. L. REv. 449 (1977).
28. R.C.M., supra note 23, at 501(a)(2).
29. As a practical matter, few enlisted personnel make this demand in part because enlisted
personnel tend to seek higher penalties for other enlisted personnel than would an officer. Everett,
Some Comments On the Role of Discretion In Military Justice, 37 LAw & CONTEmp. PROBS.
173, 205 (1972).
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In either a special or a general court-martial with members, no set number
of members is required beyond the minimum. For the accused, the number
of members selected is significant because military courts require only a twothirds vote for a guilty verdict.3" A special court-martial cannot adjudge
sentences of death or confinement for more than six months, nor grant a
dishonorable discharge. 3 ' A bad conduct discharge may be adjudged only if
the accused was provided a free military lawyer, a military judge presided
over the court, and a verbatim transcript was made.3 2
General Courts-Martial
A general court-martial is the most powerful military trial court. The full
spectrum of punishments are available, including a dishonorable discharge
and the death penalty.3 3 A general court-martial consists of a military judge
and not less than five members or, except in capital cases, a military judge
alone if requested by the accused.3 ' The defense attorney "must be admitted
to practice either before a Federal court or the highest court of a State and
be certified by the Judge Advocate General as competent to serve as counsel
at courts-martial. 35 Again, if the accused is enlisted, he may demand that
one third of the members be enlisted as well . 3 6 The accused is also entitled
to a free verbatim trial transcript.
Jurisdiction of Military Courts
Like Article III courts, jurisdiction must be established before a court-martial
can convene. Seven requirements must be met before a court-martial has
jurisdiction over a military member. The court-martial must: (1) be convened
by an official empowered to do so; (2) be properly constituted as to the number
of members; (3) be composed of members legally competent to sit thereon;
(4) have the power to try the accused; (5) have the power to try the offense
charged; (6) ensure that a proper convening authority referred the case to
a particular court-martial for trial; and (7) have the power to award the
sentence adjudged. 37 O'Callahanv. Parkerprovided a test for the fifth jurisdictional requirement.

30. Id. at 204. Critics of military justice often charge that a base commander usually "packs"
the potential member lists with law-and-order types. In reality, military juries are composed of
individuals who are available. Even so, a discussion of unlawful command influence is beyond
the scope of this note. See generally Rob, Command Influence Update: The Impact of Cruz
and Levite, ARmy LAWYER (May 1988), at 15.
31. R.C.M., supra note 23, at 201(f)(2)(B)(i).
32. Id. at 201(f)(2)(B)(ii), 1103(c).
33. U.C.M.J. art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1982) vests general courts-martial with the authority
to sentence a convicted spy to death.
34. R.C.M., supra note 23, at 501(a)(1).
35. H. MOYER, supra note 3, at 467.
36. See supra note 29.
37. E. BYmRN, MnrrARY

LAW

274-75 (3d ed. 1981).
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O'Callahan v. Parker
On July 20, 1956, Army Sergeant James O'Callahan and his roommate,
Charles Redden, left Fort Shafter, Hawaii, on an evening pass. They were
dressed in civilian clothes. After a few beers, they went to the fourth-floor
balcony of a Honolulu hotel. From there they observed a girl asleep in her
room. O'Callahan suggested that they enter the room and force the girl to
have sex with them. Redden refused and departed.
O'Callahan entered the room and attempted to sexually assault the fourteenyear-old girl. He fled the scene as she screamed for help. O'Callahan was
apprehended by a hotel security guard and placed in the custody of military
authorities. Ultimately, he confessed.
O'Callahan was tried and convicted by general court-martial of attempted
rape,38 housebreaking,39 and assault with intent to commit rape." His conviction was affirmed by an Army Board of Review and the United States Court
of Military Appeals."1
In April 1966, while in confinement, O'Callahan sought a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. He alleged that the general court-martial lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to try him for nonmilitary offenses committed off-post while on
an evening pass. The district court denied relief and the Third Circuit affirmed
without addressing the issue.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that O'Callahan's crimes
were not service-connected and therefore not triable by court-martial.42 He
was entitled to a civilian trial. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
described military courts as "a threat to liberty" that "are singularly inept
in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law."4 3
Douglas' characterization of military jurisprudence has two primary problems. First, as Chief Justice Earl Warren pointed out seven years before
O'Callahan, "the tradition of our country, from the time of the Revolution
until now, has supported the military establishment's broad power to deal
with its own personnel." 4 4
More important, any serious crime committed by a serviceman has military
significance.' 5 In fact, perhaps the principal argument against a service-

38. U.C.M.J. art. 80, 10 U.S.C. § 880 (1958).
39. U.C.M.J. art. 130, 10 U.S.C. § 930 (1958).
40. U.C.M.J. art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1958) (prejudice of good order and discipline).
41. United States v. O'Callahan, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 800 (1957).
42. 395 U.S. at 273-74.
43. Id. at 265.
44. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 181, 187 (1962).
45. Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestoneor Millstone In Military Justice, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 853, 873 (1969). For example, effect on unit morale is not contingent upon whether or
not one of its members was caught stealing on or off base. Rice, O'Callahanv. Parker: CourtMartialJurisdiction, "Service Connection," Confusion, and the Serviceman, 51 M.. L. REv.
41, 59 (1971).
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connection requirement "is that, because of discredit to the service and impairment of relationships between the military and nonmilitary communities,
there is 'military significance' to an incident where a soldier, whether or not
in uniform, breaks into an apartment at night and assaults a young girl." 4 ,
Any location-oriented test for military jurisdiction will most likely result
in inequity rather than justice. This fact is exemplified by comparing United
States v. Henderson47 with United States v. Smith. 4 Henderson and Smith
were both stationed at Ramey Air Force Base. Both were court-martialed under
article 120(b) of the U.C.M.J. and convicted of the statutory rape of dependent daughters of fellow service members. 49 Henderson took a girl to his
quarters off-base, whereas Smith took a girl to his quarters on-base. Hender5
son's conviction was reversed.5 1 Smith's conviction was affirmed. '
The court in Smith stated that Henderson differed "in only one respectthe place where the offense occurred."152 Even so, the Smith court held that
"[tihis difference [was] a vital one."' 3 In short, a completely different result
for virtually identical facts was found proper.
The second problem with Justice Douglas' opinion in O'Callahan was his
incorrect assumption that military courts are not up to civilian standards. In
reality, military courts have been setting the standard." Military suspects were
informed of their right to remain silent long before Miranda v. Arizona."
Furthermore, products of illegal military searches, seizures, and wiretapping
were excluded in military courts56 previous to Mapp v. Ohio," and Lee v.
Florida.' Perhaps most important, free defense counsel was furnished in
military court 59 some time before Gideon v. Wainwright.6" Moreover, military
defense counsel is appointed shortly after the commission of the offense;
6
whereas a public defender usually is not appointed until after arraignment. '
Justice Douglas' complaint that "[s]ubstantially different rules of evidence
and procedure apply in military trials" is at least partially no longer valid
because the military essentially adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1980.62
46. Everett, supra note 45, at 855-56.

47.
48.
49.
50.

18 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 40 C.M.R. 313 (1969).
18 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 40 C.M.R. 321 (1969).
10 U.S.C. § 920(b) (1964).
Henderson, 40 C.M.R. 313 (1969).

51. Smith, 40 C.M.R. at 322.
52. Smith, 40 C.M.R. at 321.
53. Id. at 322.
54. See Rice, supra note 45, at 61, and Everett, supra note 45, at 867.
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). CompareMiranda with U.C.M.J. art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 830 (Supp.
IV 1952).

56. M.C.M., supra note 17, at
57. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
58. 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
59.
60.
61.
62.
(2d ed.

152.

U.C.M.J. art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (Supp. IV 1952).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Rice, supra note 45, at 61 n. 124.
S. SALTZBURG, L. ScI-iNoss & D. ScIEUTmR, MILITARY RuLEs oF EVIDENCE MANUAL
1986).
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Justice Douglas also maintained that military tribunals deprived military
personnel of the right to indictment by grand jury and to trial by jury.63 In
reality, grand juries do little if anything to protect the rights of the accused.",
However, the same is not true of an article 32 investigation." In fact, the
balance is reversed because unlike grand jury investigations, the only counsel
required to be present at an article 32 investigation is representing the accused."
In addition, a military member subject to indictment by grand jury probably
would not be from the same community where civilian jurors would be selected.
He might even be viewed as an intruder. 67 In contrast, the accused may have
considerable rapport with the6 military personnel from whom court-martial
members would be selected.
In short, Justice Douglas presented a picture of military law that was both
inaccurate and unfair. Justice Harlan, in his dissent, accurately described the
majority's opinion as being "largely one-sided". 69
Interpretationsof O'Callahan
Although post-O'Callahan decisions did provide guidelines, the Supreme
Court neither defined "service-connection" in the criminal context of
O'Callahannor in subsequent opinions. 7 This failure resulted in great confusion throughout the military's judicial system.
Military courts generally responded to O'Callahan by creating exceptions
to it. Their initial response focused on Justice Douglas' misplaced emphasis
on the unavailability of grand jury indictments. This rationale was an easy
target. If the Court in O'Callahanintended the military's lack of grand jury
indictments to be a significant reason for its service-connection jurisdiction
requirement, two deeper inquiries emerge. These two inquiries were addressed
by the Court of Military Appeals.
First, the Court of Military Appeals examined whether the O'CallahanCourt
meant that the service-connection requirement should also apply to petty offenses. 7' It carved out an exception to O'Callahan and held that petty offenses did not fall under the service-connection requirement. The holding was
based on the lack of a constitutional right to grand jury indictment or jury
trial for such crimes.72
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

395 U.S. at 263-66.
D. NEUBAUER, AmERICA'S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 36 & 243 (1979).
See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
Rice, supra note 45, at 60.
Everett, supra note 45, at 865.
Id.
395 U.S. at 274.
In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Court held that military personnel

could not sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act for service-connected injuries due to negligence.

However, service-connection in the civil context appears to be broader than in the criminal context. Everett, supra note 44, at 871.
71. United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969). See Everett, supra
note 29, at 183.
72. 41 C.M.R. at 28.
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Second, the Court of Military Appeals considered whether O'Callahan was
intended to apply to crimes committed in foreign countries where grand jury
It ruled that O'Callahan did not apply to
indictment is also unavailable."
4
offenses committed overseas.7
In addition, the Court of Military Appeals also considered whether the President or any other military commander could issue an order prohibiting conduct that in itself was not service-connected in order to establish serviceconnection. 5 Of course, if such a policy were allowed, the armed services
would be free to create endless exceptions to O'Callahan merely by issuing
orders.76 On this question, the Court of Military Appeals seemed to draw
the line by rejecting the view that the issuance of an order or a regulation,
by itself, results in service-connection." Perhaps the Supreme Court noticed
the almost immediate confusion that resulted from O'Callahanand attempted
to provide guidance by recommending criteria for service-connection
jurisdiction.
In Schlesinger v. Councilman,"' the Court suggested a balancing test by
stating:
the issue turns in major part on gauging the impact of an offense
on military discipline and effectiveness, on determining whether
the military interest in deterring the offense is distinct from and
greater than that of civilian society, and on whether the distinct
military interest can be vindicated adequately in civilian courts."
Even so, the Schlesinger Court did not directly address the confusion concerning what should determine the basis for military jurisdiction."0 The Court's
first and arguably last attempt to provide direction in this area was in Relford
v. Commandant.1
Relford v. Commandant: Twelve Limitations on Jurisdiction
In Relford v. Commandant, an Army corporal was convicted by general
court-martial of kidnapping and raping two women on a military installation. On appeal the Supreme Court enumerated twelve factors that would
tend to defeat court-martial subject-matter jurisdiction. " They are: (1) the
serviceman's proper absence from base; (2) the crime's commission away from
the base; (3) its commission at a place not under military control; (4) its com73. United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969). See Everett, supra
note 29, at 183.
74. 41 C.M.R. at 68.
75. United States v. Castro, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969).
76. Everett, supra note 29, at 183.
77. 40 C.M.R. at 312.
78. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
79. Id. at 760.
80. Cooper, O'CallahanRevisited: Severing The Service Connection, 76 Mm. L. Rav. 165,
166 (1967).
81. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
82. Id. at 365.
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mission within U.S. territorial limits and not in an occupied zone of a foreign
country; (5) its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority
stemming from the war power; (6) the absence of any connection between
accused's military duties and the crime; (7) the victim's not being engaged
in performance of any duty relating to the military; (8) the presence and
availability of a civilian court in which the case can be prosecuted; (9) the
absence of any flouting of military authority; (10) the absence of any threat
to a military post; (11) the absence of any violation of military property; and
(12) the offense being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts.8"
Following this test, the Court determined that the Army had jurisdiction and
4
affirmed Relford's convictions.1
Arguably, the twelve Relford factors created even more confusion concerning the nature of service-connection jurisdiction. Military appellate courts attempted to follow Relford while simultaneously creating additional exceptions
to O'Callahan.
In United States v. Scott,85 a Yeoman Second Class was charged at a special
court-martial with conspiring with a Junior Petty Officer to entice females
to provide prostitution for new Navy recruits. The military trial judge dismissed
the case for lack of service-connection. The United States Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Military Review reversed. The court in Scott followed Relford and
held that the conspiracy to provide sex for hire, although off-base, constituted
a flouting of military authority. Therefore, the court established the offenses
as service-connected. 8 Scott provided an example of how an off-base offense
could be service-connected.
Drug-Related Cases and Service-Connection
A split of authority exists as to whether drug-related cases, off-base or on,
are service-connected. In United States v. Alef,87 an Air Force sergeant was
convicted by special court-martial of simultaneous possession and sale of cocaine. The Alef court reversed the defendant's conviction and held that the
off-post sale of cocaine, during off-duty hours to an undercover Office of
Special Investigations agent, was not service-connected in light of the twelve
88
Relford factors.
The majority opinion attempted to comply with O'Callahan,Relford, and
Schlesinger by narrowing the issue into simple components.89 The majority
sought to encourage proof of the facts necessary for jurisdiction by requiring
that they be alleged. 0 This requirement also provided the accused an increased

83. AiR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SCHOOL, MILITARY JUSTCE DIcS.BOOK, 2-21 - 2-22
(chapter two authored by Captain Dixie Morrow) (1987).
84. Relford, 401 U.S. at 367-70.
85. 24 M.J. 578 (N.M.C.M.R. 1987).
86. Id. at 584.
87. 3 M.J. 414 (C.M.A. 1977).
88. Id. at 416.
89. James, Pleadingand Practice Under United States v. Alef, 20 A.F. L. REv. 22, 31 (1978).
90. Alef, 3 M.J. at 419.
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opportunity to contest the prosecution's theory of trial. Judge Perry's concurring opinion agreed with the majority and maintained that the intent of
Alef was to require "the Government to allege all facts necessary to constitute personal and subject-matter jurisdiction in any case." 9 '
Although Alef is usually cited as placing a limit on jurisdiction, it is not
the typical drug-related case. In 1980, the landmark case of United States
v. Trottierz created another exception to O'Callahan by holding that practically every involvement of military personnel with a controlled substance
is service-related.
Airman first class Gerard Trottier was convicted by special court-martial
for selling marijuana at Bolling Air Force Base and for selling both marijuana and LSD in Oxon Hill, Maryland. The Air Force Court of Military
Review affirmed his convictions. 3 The U.S. Court of Military Appeals granted
review.9'
Chief Judge Everett, writing for the majority summarized his opinion by
stating the following.
In short, when we reflect on the broad scope of the war powers,
the realistic manner in which the Supreme Court has allowed Congress to exercise power over commerce, and the flexibility which
the Supreme Court intended for the concept of service connection
so that, with the aid of experience, there could be a suitable response
to changing conditions that affect the military society, we come
to the conclusion that almost every involvement of service personnel
with the commerce in drugs is "service-connected.""
Summary of O'Callahan and Its Progeny
O'Callahanand its progeny clearly created more problems than they solved. Chaos resulted because the Supreme Court avoided a definition of service96
connection and because military courts were busy establishing exceptions.

91. Id. at 421.
92. 9 M.J. 337, 350 (C.M.A. 1980).
93. United States v. Trottier, 4 M.J. 916 (A.F.C.M.R. 1978), aff'd, 9 M.J. 337 (U.S.C.M.A.

1980).
94. 9 M.J. at 337.
95. Id. at 350. See generally United States v. Osburn, 23 M.J. 903 (N.M.C.M.R. 1987)
(wrongful use of marijuana and cocaine during extended leave); United States v. Askew, 23 M.J.

818 (N.M.C.M.R. 1987) (drug transaction in off-base parking lot); United States v. Walker,
23 M.J. 740 (A.C.M.R. 1987) (sold only to civilians off-base); United States v. Hemenway, 19
M.J. 955 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985) (use of cocaine during 40-day leave); Murray v. Haldeman, 16
M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1983) (test is if individual is subject to effects of drug when entering base);
United States v. Kashiwabara, 10 M.J. 602 (A.F.C.M.R. 1980), petition denied, 10 M.J. 344
(1981) (on-base negotiations consummated by off-base sale). But see United States v. Barideaux,
22 M.J. 60 (C.M.A. 1986) (insufficient interests to warrant jurisdiction over sale of marihuana
to CID agent).
96. See generally Tomes, The Imagination of the Prosecutor: The Only Limitation to OffPost JurisdictionNow, Fifteen Years After O'Callahan v. Parker, 25 A.F. L. REv. 1 (1985).
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For example, in addition to drug-related offenses, service-connection excep-

tions were created for sex crimes, 97 overseas exceptions98 and others."9
Despite these problems, five generalizations about service-connection jurisdic-

tion were established. First, offenses committed on-base were normally serviceconnected. 00 Second, on-base preparation to commit an offense might or might

not be service-related.' 0' Third, the victim's status as a member of the military
did not, by itself, establish service-connection. 10 2 Fourth, the accused's status

as a member of the military did not, by itself, establish service-connection. 0 3
Fifth, most drug offenses are service-connected."

4

The Solorio decision affected these generalizations in two ways. First, the
opposite of the third generalization became the supreme law of the land. Sec-

ond, the other four generalizations, absent a return to pre-Solorio law, are
now largely of only historical interest.
Solorio v. United States
Richard Solorio was stationed in Juneau, Alaska with the Seventeenth Coast
Guard District. While on active duty in Alaska, he sexually abused two

daughters of other Coast Guardsmen. This abuse continued for two years
until he was transferred to Governors Island, New York. An investigation
of similar abuse in New York led to the discovery of the crimes in Alaska.
97. See United States v. Brenton, 24 M.J. 562 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987), petitionfor review denied,
25 M.J. 393 (U.S.C.M.A. 1981) (found jurisdiction under Relford when crime involved indecent
acts with female under age of 16); United States v. Abell, 23 M.J. 99 (C.M.A. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1028 (1987) (sexual abuse in area that was on housing referral list); United States v.
Bolser, 22 M.J. 564 (A.F.C.M.R. 1986) (molesting one's own children); United States v. Benedict,
20 M.J. 939 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985) (indecent acts with 10-year-old dependent daughter off-base);
United States v. Rappaport, 19 M.J. 708 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984), aff'd, 22 M.J. 445 (U.S.C.M.A.
1986), petitionfor review denied, 26 M.J. 80 (U.S.C.M.A. 1988) (psychologist engaged in sodomy
and adultery with lieutenant off-base); United States v. Wierzba, 11 M.J. 742 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981)
(used official status to engage in indecent liberties with CAP cadets); United States v. Coronado,
11 M.J. 522 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981), aff'd, 15 M.J. 750 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983), petition for review
denied, 18 M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1984) (off-base sodomy of enlisted man by officer); United States
v. Brown, 8 M.J. 501 (A.F.C.M.R. 1979), petition for review denied, 8 M.J. 234 (C.M.A. 1980)
(continuing course of homosexual conduct). But see United States v. Black, 24 M.J. 600
(A.F.C.M.R. 1987), petitionfor review denied, 25 M.J. 373 (C.M.A. 1987) (no jurisdiction when
crime involved off-base sodomy with accused's daughter); United States v. Avila, 24 M.J. 501
(A.F.C.M.R. 1987), rev'd, 27 M.J. 62 (C.M.A. 1988) (no jurisdiction when crime involved offbase sodomy with accused's four-year-old stepdaughter; reversed when service-connection requirement was abolished); United States v. Barber, 23 M.J. 751 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987), petition
for review denied, 25 M.J. 206 (C.M.A. 1987) (no jurisdiction when crime involved off-base
sodomy with accused's son).
98. United States v. Overton, 24 M.J. 309 (C.M.A. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 487 (1987)
(larceny in the Philippines); United States v. Keaton, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969) (assault with intent
to commit murder in the Philippines).
99. United States v. Henderson, 23 M.J. 860 (A.C.M.R. 1987) (bad checks).
100. Am FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE SCHOOL, supra note 83, at 2-31.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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A general court-martial was convened in New York. Solorio was charged
with a total of twenty-one specifications of sexual abuse of the dependent
children of fellow servicemembers in both New York and Alaska. Solorio
moved to dismiss the charges for the alleged crimes committed in Alaska
because (1) there was no base or post where Coast Guard personnel lived
and worked in Juneau, (2) his alleged crimes in Alaska were committed in
his privately owned home, and (3) the holdings in O'Callahanand Relford
required some type -6f service-connection.""The trial Eourt granted Solorio's motion. The government appealed to the
Coast Guard Court of Military Review, which reinstated the Alaska charges. ,06
The Court of Military Appeals affirmed the reinstatement by holding that
service connection existed because "sex offenses against young children ...
have a continuing effect on the victims and their families and ultimately on
the morale of any military unit or organization to which the family member
is assigned."'0 7 The court-martial was reconvened and Solorio was convicted
of twelve of the twenty-one specifications. The United States Supreme Court
granted Solorio's petition for a writ of certiorari.
The Supreme Court expressly overruled O'Callahan and held that subject
matter jurisdiction of courts-martial depends solely on the accused's status
as a member of the armed forces and not on the service-connection of the
offense charged. 0 ' Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion focused on the ambiguous history of British and American court-martial jurisdiction and on the
unbroken line of decisions from 1866 to 1960, showing that American courtmartial jurisdiction was historically based solely on the status of the accused. 109
Furthermore, the majority recognized the confusion resulting from
O'Callahan."'
The three dissenters focused on the accused's loss of the right to indictment by grand jury and to trial
by jury." They also disagreed with Rehnquist's
2
interpretation of history."
Perhaps more important, following Solorio, Representative Pat Schroeder
(D-Colorado) introduced legislation on March 29, 1988 that would reestablish

105. 107 S.Ct. at 2926.
106. United States v. Solorio, 21 M.J. 512 (C.G.C.M.R. 1985), aff'd, 107 S.Ct. 2924 (1987),
reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 30 (1988).
107. United States v. Solorio, 21 M.J. 251, 256 (C.M.A. 1986), aff'd 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987),
reh'g denied, 108 S.Ct. (1988).
108. 107 S.Ct. at 2933.
109. Williamson, Solorio v. United States, 14 REPORTER 2 (1987).
110. Id.
111. Williamson, supra note 109, at 2. Much of the response to O'Callahan was generally
favorable. McCoy, Equal Justice for Serviceman: The Situation Before and Since O'Callahan
v. Parker, 16 N.Y.L.F. 1 (1970); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-The Serviceman'sRight To A Civilian
Trial For A Non-Service Connected Crime, 19 BuFFALo L. Rav. 400 (1970); Note, O'Callahan
v. Parker:New Limitation On Court-MartialJurisdiction,61 J. CMaM. L. C. & P.S. 195 (1970);
Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Non-Military Offenses Committed Off Post While On Leave Not
Justiciable By Courts-Martial, 18 KAN. L. REv. 335 (1970).
112. Williamson, supra note 109, at 2.
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the service-connection doctrine. " ' This legislation would allow trial by courtmartial only if the offenses were in one of the following categories.
(1) The offense was committed in time of war, (2) The offense
was committed on a military installation, vessel, or aircraft of the
United States, (3) The offense was committed outside the United
States or any territory or possession of the United States and is
not punishable under any other law of the United States, (4) The
offense is punishable without indictment by grand jury or trial by
jury under another law of the United States or under the law of
any State, the District of Columbia, or any territory or possession
of the United States and (5) The offense is service-connected."t 4
Representative Schroeder further stated that "[iut is well settled that drug11 5
related offenses are a priori service connected."
Contrary to Schroeder's position, the Solorio military membership test is
clearly preferable to the O'Callahan service connection test. Of course, the
complete impact of Solorio has yet to be seen. The increase in caseload for
military attorneys could be at least partially offset by eliminating the serviceconnection jurisdictional challenge.
The nature and scope of military interaction with civilian authorities will
also change. Under article 14 of the U.C.M.J., the military has discretion
6
on whether to deliver a military defendant to civil authorities for trial." If
a civilian conviction interrupts the execution of a court-martial sentence, the
military may request that the accused be returned to military custody, after
the accused has answered to civilian authorities for his or her offense." 1 This
procedure is not as unfair as it may initially sound.
While courts-martial have exclusive jurisdictions over purely military offenses, " 8 offenses that violate both military and civilian law may be tried
by either a: court-martial or the proper civilian tribunal." 9 As a general rule,
if the accused has previously been tried by a civilian court for the same offense, any court-martial charges or specifications will be dismissed.' 20 However,

113. H.R. 4282, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
114. Court-MartialJurisdiction, 15 REPORTER 26 (June 1988). This legislation was referred
to the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on April 7,
1988. The bill died in committee and had not been reintroduced at press time. Telephone interview with Chris Nichols, Field Representative for Congressman Dave McCurdy (Feb. 6, 1989).
115. 134 CoNG. Rc. E879 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1988) (extensions of remarks).
116. 10 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
117. Id.
118. R.C.M., supra note 23, at 201(d)(1).
119. Id. at 201(d)(2). Generally, military authorities will defer prosecution to civilian courts
if a district attorney makes such a request.
120. Id. at 907(b)(2). If the civilian court were a federal court, retrial in a military court would
be double jeopardy. State courts could present a different situation. Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969) (trial in a state court is not a legal bar to a later prosecution in a federal court).
However, "[m]ilitary punitive measures will not be taken when state civil authorities have brought
the alleged offender to trial for substantially the same offense, regardless of whether conviction
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when an offense violates military, civilian, and/or foreign law, the forum
is determined by the nation, state, or agency and is not a right of the accused.' I I
An innocent accused, given a choice, would probably opt for trial by courtmartial, where his chances for acquittal are arguably greater.
F. Lee Bailey, who started as a Marine Corps legal officer, compared military
justice to civilian courts by stating the following.
If I were accused of an offense and I were innocent-I didn't do
it-I would much rather be in the military system from start to
finish; but if I were guilty of that offense, I would like to find
me a jury somewhere and wait, because reasonable doubts can be
fashioned; prominent counsel can dismantle even the toughtest case;
and there would be a chance of squeaking through. I suppose the
difference is accounted for in part because, although military justice
is often accused of all kinds of politicking, that really doesn't
'
happen very often. 22
While it is fairly obvious that Solorio will result in an increased number
of military defendants, it may not be as obvious that abolishing the serviceconnection requirement will increase the rights of the accused. Military courts
are at least as equitable and just as their civilian counterparts.'12 Moreover,
military courts, with a greater emphasis on pretrial fact finding, are far less
likely to convict an innocent individual. In addition to removing some of the
workload from civilian courts, Solorio will help civilian courts in other ways
as well.
Unfortunately, funding for the judicial branch has not traditionally been
a priority for governments at any level. Some local and county governments
have difficulty locating the required funds for jury trials.' 24 If these courts
were required to handle all off-base offenses committed by nearby military
personnel, the effort could bankrupt the county's budget.' 2 Consequently,
Solorio will help civilian courts located near military installations to decrease
their backlog and will allow those civilian courts to reallocate their scarce
financial resources.
In short, Solorio has contribued tremendously to the civilian judicial system.
But, more important, it has given the military what it has always insisted

or acquittal has resulted." Air Force Regulation 111-1, 2-4a, I August 1984. Cf. United States
v. Talbot, 825 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 773 (1987) (federal district
court has concurrent jurisdiction with military tribunal).
121. R.C.M., supra note 23, 201(d)(3). Florida v. Simanonak, 850 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir. 1988)

(driver's military status did not justify removal of state criminal prosecution). See also Return
of Servicemen From the United States to the Host State For Trial and Confinement, 15 REPORTER
20 (Sept. 1988) (international law).

122. Bailey, Evolution of MilitaryJustice Under the Constitution, in 25 M.J. CIII, CXIV (1987).
123. See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
124. Hodson, Evolution of MilitaryJustice Under the Constitution, in 25 M.J. CXIX, CXX
(1987).

125. Id. The Attorney General of Alaska, through a district attorney, deferred the prosecution of Richard Solorio in part because of the expense involved. 21 M.J. at 515.
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